the more developed economies) partly because, despite uncertainties, the scientific basis for many of these concerns is thought to be more solid as research proceeds, and partly because the demands for the services of the natural environment increase with rising incomes. These services include clean air, potable water and filtered sunlight; the capacity to absorb waste; and pleasure from visiting or even just know ing of the existence of unspoilt wilderness areas. In fact, the demand for environ mental services tends to grow faster than demand for many other goods and serv ices in middle-and high-income countries. But the supply of these environmental services is not unlimited, and for many of them the markets necessary for rationing their use are incomplete or yet to emerge.
To help overcome this market imperfection, the more advanced economies are establishing institutional structures for arriving at something approaching a social consensus on appropriate environmental policies, for allocating clearer property rights, and for implementing and enforcing policies (Grossman, 1994) . These de velopments are tending to occur faster as an economy's income grows faster, and they tend to begin at a lower level of per capita income the more densely populated the economy, other things equal.
As a resource-rich, lightly populated economy, Australia has a comparative ad vantage in goods and services whose production requires relatively intensive use of the natural environment: land for farming and grazing, raw materials for energy, minerals and metals, coastal areas for tourism, open spaces for the discharge of pollutive industries to be dissipated, and so on. That comparative advantage is strengthening with economic growth abroad, and more so the faster other econo mies grow relative to ours and the more that growth abroad is concentrated in densely populated middle-and upper-income countries (as it has been, notably in East Asia). That is, our terms of trade are improving and we are sharing some of die benefits of their faster economic growdi. We would gain even if those countries did not change dieir environmental policies in die course of their economic growth; but we are gaining additionally to the extent that diey are raising their environmental standards and charges and thereby effectively increasing dieir demand for the goods and services of our natural environment diat are embodied in our exports.
An obvious example is agriculture. Because land in Australia is relatively cheap, our farmers use relatively few agricultural chemicals (such as fertiliser, pesti cides, animal growth hormones) which are effectively substitutes for land. Consequendy, Australian food contains few chemical residues: a feature we can, and are, increasingly exploit in marketing our farm products abroad. Furthermore, in so far as any taxes or restrictions are imposed on die use of farm chemicals in Australia, they are likely to be less severe than those imposed in more densely populated and higher-income countries.2 Hence the net impact of the greening of farm policies at home and abroad on the export competitiveness of Australian farmers is likely to be positive: likewise for mining and other producers who take advantage of our abundance of natural resources.
Australian exporters would be delighted if the story could end here; but unfor tunately it cannot, for several reasons. One is that foreign producers who are be coming less competitive because of their government's imposition of stricter envi ronmental standards and charges are demanding higher import barriers to protect them from that loss in competitiveness. Such protectionism is unwarranted on economic efficiency grounds, since the environmental standard is aiming to elimi nate an unjustifiable implicit subsidy rather than add an unjustifiable tax. Yet some times it is the workers rather than the owners of industries who are demanding pro tection, afraid that the owners will transfer their operations offshore to locations with more lenient environmental standards, so destroying local jobs.
Another complication is that environmental concerns are taking on more of an international and even global orientation, well beyond the earlier intra-national or trans-border concerns with neighbouring countries. Possible climate changes and ozone depletion prompt concern about the emission of carbon or the use of CFCs not just at home but also abroad. The NIMBY (not-in-my-back-yard) phenomenon is becoming less relevant as awareness increases that relocation of a pollutive indus try to a country with laxer environmental standards may well increase global pollu tion. The irony is that that relocation and increased environmental damage may have been stimulated by the raising of environmental standards in one's own coun try! Such pressures are likely to increase as the world economy becomes more inte grated and more countries begin to industrialise, particularly since global population and consumption growth will be concentrated in these poor but modernising coun tries for the foreseeable future. Yet they are among the countries where the new institutions to reduce environmental degradation will be slow in coming, because the costs of sacrificing consumption of material goods in order to achieve higher environmental standards weigh much more heavily in poorer than richer econo mies. Moreover, national differences in willingness and capacity to preserve the natural environment apply not just to physical pollution. They apply also to the abuse of animals, species extinction, and the logging or flooding of pristine wilder ness areas from which people derive varying degrees of aesthetic pleasure, regard less of national boundaries.
Since personal values play an important part in international debates on these issues, the scope for friction between countries is considerable. Yet cooperation between sovereign states is required for efficient solutions to such international en vironmental problems. It is therefore not surprising that institutional innovations to address these concerns have been slow in coming -certainly much slower than environmental groups in some rich countries would like. It is out of frustration over the pace of progress towards international environmental agreements that such groups have turned their attention to one of die few instruments they perceive their national governments to have for influencing environmental outcomes in other countries, namely, trade policy.
Trade Policy and Environmental Objectives
Consider the recent dispute between the United States and Mexico over the alleged use of dolphin-unfriendly nets by Mexican tuna fishermen. US environmentalists, distressed at the netting of dolphin by American tuna fishermen, succeeded in get ting the practice stopped -only to find the reduced domestic supply of tuna being made up by imports from Mexico. The remaining US tuna fishermen therefore joined environmentalists in calling for a ban on those imports, even though it is im possible to tell whether a particular batch of tuna was caught in dolphin-unfriendly nets or otherwise. The motive for US policy action in this case is evidently a mix ture of traditional competitiveness concerns and a concern felt by some in the US (not entirely shared elsewhere ) for the global commons and/or for the welfare of dolphins. And the GATT's dispute panel argued in support of Mexico's objection to the import ban partly because the policy was incapable of distinguishing between the dolphin-friendly and dolphin-unfriendly product (whereas it would not have objected to a ban on the sale of tuna products unable to carry the label 'dolphinsafe', for that ban would have applied equally to domestic and imported goods).3
Such use of trade measures to address environmental issues should concern the world at large, and Australian exporters in particular, for at least three reasons. First, trade measures are typically not first-best instruments for achieving environ mental objectives, so their use in place of more efficient instruments reduces the level and growth of economic welfare unnecessarily, and may even add to rather than reduce environmental degradation (see Anderson, 1992a) . Second, concern for the environment may be used (or rather abused) as an excuse to raise trade bar riers in ways that are difficult to prove to be inconsistent with a country's obligations under GATT. Accepting the US tuna ban, for example, would have opened a large loophole in the GATT for any country unilaterally to apply trade restrictions not for die purpose of enforcing its own laws widiin its jurisdiction but to impose its stan dards on odier countries and/or to effectively override previous commitments not to raise import barriers. Third, if it leads to an escalation in trade disputes, it could be followed by retaliation and counter-retaliation, die result of which would be to undermine the muldlateral trading system's provision of predictable market access opportunides on which the prosperity of small open economies such as Australia depends.
Some environmentalists would welcome the demise of the GATT rules-based trading system, wrongly believing that GATT is bad for the environment. They believe this for two reasons. One is that it appears to undermine their efforts to raise environmental standards (as in the tuna-dolphin example mentioned above), even diough diere is nothing in the General Agreement that precludes a country from applying measures to protect human, animal or plant life or health widiin its jurisdicdon. The other is that GATT's purpose is to promote trade liberalisation, two effects of which are to boost global incomes and to cause some international relocation of production and consumption. Both of diese effects worry some envi ronmentalists, yet they need not.
Economic Growth and the Environment
Consider first the economic growdi point. Some believe an expansion of global production and hence consumption is undesirable simply because they think it will increase demands on die natural environment. This is a neo-Malthusian view of the world that is as misguided as Maldius's original concern that our growing population would be incapable of feeding itself. It ignores die fact that income growth brings with it numerous changes in behaviour patterns. One such change, already noted, is that as incomes rise in response to trade reforms, more-stringent environmental policies tend to be implemented. This is because die demand for such policies rises widi income: they are both more desired and more affordable. As well, higher incomes in poorer countries lead eventually to lower population growth rates, which reduces pressure on both rural and urban environments. And as the value of poor people's time in developing countries increases as trade liberalisation boosts the demand for labour, the relative cost of using wood as a source of household fuel rises also because of the time taken to collect it. Since four-fifths of the timber har vested in developing countries is used as household fuel, this alone could have a major beneficial impact in reducing deforestation and carbon dioxide levels.
For all these reasons, countries tend to go through an environmental transition, just as they tend to go through a demographic transition as their incomes rise. That is, instead of environmental degradation continuing to worsen as it would widi out put and consumption growth if no abatement policies were introduced, the extent of damage per capita tends to level off and then fall with economic growth as die government responds to demands for tougher environmental laws. Systematic evi dence of the extent to which this has been happening is not yet well documented, but the recent survey by Grossman (1994) is cautiously supportive of this view.
The Case of Coal
Just as these behavioural changes are not appreciated, so the environmental effects of trade liberalisation through the relocation of production and consumption are poorly understood. It is not inevitable that a particular environmental problem will diminish as a consequence of trade reform. But that often will be the case, and all die more so if well-targeted environmental policies are introduced at the time of the liberalisation.
Consider die case of one of the world's most distorted commodity markets, namely, coal.4 As a supplier of nearly one-third of the world's energy, coal is a major contributor to local, trans-border and global environmental problems, includ-ing climate change and acid rain. Advanced economies in the northern hemisphere tend to restrict imports and overprice coal (while developing countries, particularly the former centrally planned economies, tend to restrict its exportation and under price it), relative to the price in international markets (see Steenblik & Wigley 1990; Jolly, Beck & Savage 1990) . Reducing coal price supports in the advanced econo mies might be expected to increase coal use and therefore worsen the environment; but not necessarily. On the contrary, if the consumer price of coal in those coun tries remains (or is set) at its optimal level and just the producer price is lowered to the international level, domestic coal consumption would not rise. But two other changes would improve the environment. One is that cleaner-burning imported coal could substitute for the lower-quality domestic coal, the production of which would fall. The other is that the international price of coal would rise, thereby re ducing energy consumption and hence carbon emissions in the rest of the world. Since such a reform would at the same time raise real incomes, for the usual gainsfrom-trade reasons, it contrasts markedly with proposals to reduce climate change by imposing carbon taxes globally -proposals on which international agreement in any case would be extremely difficult to reach.
Some Implications for Australia
Concern for the natural environment almost certainly will increase over time, will gradually spread beyond the richest countries, and will have more of a global orien tation. This, together with the increasing interdependence among the world's na tional economies as barriers to international trade and investment fall, ensures that even if Australia did not alter its own environmental policies, its economy will be affected by changes in other countries' environmental policies. Given our abundant natural resources, the direct effects of those changes are likely to be beneficial to Australian exporters, since they are likely to outweigh die direct effect of our own environmental policies on domestic cost structures. But there is the very real dan ger that those potential net benefits will be more than offset by several negative de velopments. These include using the environment as an excuse to raise import barriers, using trade measures to bludgeon Australia and other countries into adopting higher environmental standards than are appropriate or desired in our more spacious and lower income setting, and lobbying against trade liberalisationall of which are tending to corrode the GATT rules-based multilateral trading sys tem on which Australia's prosperity heavily depends.
Countries will genuinely disagree on how to deal with some international envi ronmental issues, just as groups within countries do -only more so because of wider differences in incomes and preferences between countries. The optimal so lution is to be found in more negotiations, informed by results of research on the environmental as well as economic effects of alternative policies.
Despite the interest shown in it by environmental groups, the GATT (or rather its prospective replacement, the World Trade Organisation, W TO) is not the most obvious forum for such negotiations. But if it is left to do what it is designed to do, namely to facilitate an open, predictable, rules-based global trading system, it will indirectly foster a better use of the world's natural (and other) resources. And it will not be stopping countries implementing appropriate environmental policies within their juristrictions. Nor does G A IT stop trade measures being used in interna tional environmental agreements, so long as a dispute between GA' 11 -contracting parties does not arise: witness their undisputed use as part of the Montreal Protocol on the phasing out of CFCs (Enders & Porges, 1992) , and in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. As well, the GATT could serve as a transparency agency if contracting parties were to agree to notify the Secretariat of any new trade-related environmental measures (TREMs -a likely new word in GATT-speak).
As a small open economy outside the two major trading blocs (the European Union and the North American free-trade area), Australia relies heavily on the con tinued health of the multilateral trading system . Now is therefore not too soon to expand our investments in forums such as APEC and the OECD, as well as the W TO , to maximise the advantages and minimise the damage from the inevitable inter-linking of trade and environment issues. Among other things, that requires persuading environmental groups that, instead of opposing trade liberalisation and/or looking to the GATT/W TO to provide sticks to police international envi ronmental agreements, they should advocate less costly and more effective direct measures for addressing environmental problems. But it also could include form ing a group of unsubsidised coal-exporting countries, to complement the Cairns Group of lightly subsidising food-exporting countries. Both could advertise the fact that liberalising trade in those two highly distorted commodity markets (coal and food) would yield not only the conventional economic gains from trade expansion but also improvements to the environment. A coal-exporting group could also promote the idea that lowering coal-producer subsidies and import barriers offers a far more certain route to reducing carbon emissions than the less practical idea of an international agreement to impose a carbon tax.
